The government says the anti-protest bill was just a small tweak of the existing law. Don’t believe it.
In post-Occupy America, it’s often hard to know whether new citizen protest laws signal the end of free speech or a mere tweak of the machine. That looks to be the case with the new anti-protest bill that passed the House of Representatives overwhelmingly two weeks ago and was signed into law by the president soon thereafter. On its face, the new legislation doesn’t change a whole lot.
Yet the Occupy protesters are in an uproar that the bill both targets them and also signals a radical shift in free speech law. Almost nobody else seems to have noticed it at all. Who’s right?
That all depends on what you want to protest and where.
H.R. 347, benignly titled the Federal Restricted Buildings and Grounds Improvement Act,
passed the House 399-3. Such a lopsided vote suggests that nobody in
Congress is bothered by this, on either side of the aisle. When
President Obama signed it on March 8, almost nobody seems to have
cared.
Simply put, the way the bill will “improve” public grounds is by
moving all those unsightly protesters elsewhere. The law purports to
update an old law, Section 1752 of Title 18 of the United States Code,
that restricted areas around the president, vice president, or any
others under the protection of the Secret Service. The original law was
enacted in 1971 and amended in 2006. At first blush, the big change here
is that while the old law made it a federal offense to "willfully and
knowingly" enter a restricted space, now prosecutors need only show that
you did it "knowingly"—that you knew the area was restricted, even if
you didn’t know it was illegal to enter the space. This has been
characterized in some quarters as a small technical change that hardly
warrants an arched eyebrow, much less a protest.
But it’s important to understand what has changed since the
original law was enacted in 1971, because it shows how much a tiny tweak
to the intent requirement in a statute can impact the free speech of
everyone.
For one thing, the law makes it easier for the government to
criminalize protest. Period. It is a federal offense, punishable by up
to 10 years in prison to protest anywhere the Secret Service might be
guarding someone. For another, it’s almost impossible to predict what
constitutes “disorderly or disruptive conduct” or what sorts of conduct authorities deem to “impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of Government business or official functions.”
The types of events and individuals warranting Secret Service
protection have grown exponentially since the law was enacted in 1971.
Today, any occasion that is officially defined as a National Special
Security Event calls for Secret Service protection. NSSE’s can include
basketball championships, concerts, and the Winter Olympics, which have
nothing whatsoever to do with government business, official functions,
or improving public grounds. Every Super Bowl since 9/11 has been
declared an NSSE.
And that brings us to the real problem with the change to the old
protest law. Instead of turning on a designated place, the protest ban
turns on what persons and spaces are deemed to warrant Secret Service
protection. It’s a perfect circle: The people who believe they are
important enough to warrant protest can now shield themselves from
protestors. No wonder the Occupy supporters are worried. In the spirit
of “free speech zones,” this law creates another space in which
protesters are free to be nowhere near the people they are protesting.
Consider that more than 6,700 people have been arrested at Occupy
events since last September. Thus, while these changes to the law are
not the death of free speech, they aren’t as trivial as the
administration would have you believe. Rather, they are part of an
incremental and persistent effort by the government to keep
demonstrators away from events involving those at the top of the
political food chain.
Let’s start by recalling that political speech—of the sort you might
direct toward Newt Gingrich or Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, both of
whom merit Secret Service protection—is what the First Amendment most
jealously protects.
Demonstrators can almost never be muzzled based on what it is they want to say. The First Amendment also has a special solicitude for speech in what are called traditional public fora. There is a presumed right of access to streets, sidewalks, and public parks for the purpose of engaging in political discussion and protest. And while the government can always impose reasonable limits on demonstrations to ensure public order, that power comes with a caveat: It must never be used to throttle unpopular opinion or to discriminate against disfavored speakers. That is a powerful caveat: The degree of slack a court will cut any given restriction on public protest will rest on whether the government appears to be acting even handedly.
Demonstrators can almost never be muzzled based on what it is they want to say. The First Amendment also has a special solicitude for speech in what are called traditional public fora. There is a presumed right of access to streets, sidewalks, and public parks for the purpose of engaging in political discussion and protest. And while the government can always impose reasonable limits on demonstrations to ensure public order, that power comes with a caveat: It must never be used to throttle unpopular opinion or to discriminate against disfavored speakers. That is a powerful caveat: The degree of slack a court will cut any given restriction on public protest will rest on whether the government appears to be acting even handedly.
Restrictions that apply equally to all subjects and all points of
view will usually be approved by the courts if they are narrowly
designed to advance a significant governmental interest, such as public
safety. But protest restrictions that discriminate based on subject or
viewpoint must be absolutely necessary to serve a compelling state
interest. Courts rarely permit them.
The changes in Section 1752 thus really do matter because they permit
those in power to relegate their detractors to perform their political
speech in remote locations, far from the public and the press. They do
so in the name of protecting the security of the government official,
despite the fact that their actual motivation for doing so has
everything to do with the message of their opponents. Law professor
Timothy Zick of William and Mary Law School published an outstanding
analysis of what are known as “spatial tactics” in the Texas Law Review
a few years back. When it comes to relegating demonstrators to
obscurity, two approaches predominate: keeping protesters outside an
expansive, sanitized bubble that surrounds the very event they have come
to protest, or allowing them to come closer, but only within the
confines of heavily policed “protest pens” that one federal judge
likened to temporary internment camps.
Here’s one way the new legislation becomes doubly problematic: The
exclusion zones imposed by Section 1752 have no natural or intuitive
spatial boundaries. They can be as large as law enforcement claims is
necessary to ensure the security of whoever the Secret Service is
protecting. The “free speech zone” is a moving target, not a delineated
area.
Brett Bursey
learned that distinction the hard way. The 50-year-old brought an
antiwar sign to an October 2002 Bush rally at an airport in Columbia,
S.C. Police and Secret Service agents told Bursey to take his sign to a
free speech zone a half-mile away or face arrest for trespass. He
refused.
Bursey knew more about state law than the officers arresting him.
Thirty years earlier, he had demonstrated against the Vietnam War when
Richard Nixon visited the same airport, and demonstrators who refused to
disperse were charged with trespass. The South Carolina Supreme Court
threw out their convictions.
So, not unreasonably, Bursey thought he’d get the same result in
2002, and to a point, he was right. The state trespass charges against
him were indeed dismissed on the strength of the precedent that he
himself had helped to set a generation earlier. But four months later,
he was charged with violating Section 1752. His conviction was upheld on
appeal.
Bursey later described his experience to the San Francisco Chronicle.
When he asked authorities if the problem with him staying in the area
was related to the content of his sign, police told him that it did. As
to geography: “The problem was, the restricted area kept moving. It was
wherever I happened to be standing.”
Bursey might not have been convicted had he not engaged in a lengthy
discussion with police regarding the legality of his actions, which
helped to prove that his incursion was willful. A showing of that mental
state is no longer necessary, however. In futzing with the intent
requirements of Section 1752, Congress may well have had Bursey in mind.
It is tempting to dismiss the exile of protesters as a reasonable
concession to security in what law enforcement would like you to believe
is a new age of terrorism. After all, they will say, demonstrators are
not being silenced; they are merely being denied access to the
forum of their choice and the chance to amplify their own message by
presenting it against the backdrop of the message they oppose. But that
is precisely why we should be concerned.
Whatever they have come to say, the presence of demonstrators at
these events carries a powerful message in and of itself that cannot be
delivered as effectively in any other place. Being permitted to deliver
their message in the same forum and at the same time as the speaker
they oppose highlights the passion and commitment that animates the
protesters. It underscores the existence of dissent, which is precisely
what those who would sanitize the space around high officials would have
us forget.
In short, citizen protests puncture the pretty, patriotic illusion of
a focus-grouped, Photoshopped media event, and replace it with the
gritty patriotic reality of democracy in action. That’s why the teeny
cosmetic changes to Section 1752, which purport to be about new kinds of
security, are really all about optics. They conflate dissent with
danger, a Cold War habit which America was beginning to outgrow, but
which after 9/11 seems to be a permanent part of the political landscape.